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Abstract  
 This article introduces a behavioural economics approach towards 
decision-making and uses empirical data to indicate how anchoring 
heuristics might bias measurement results in marketing research. The 
purpose of the designed research is to decide whether the first piece of 
information presented to a respondent during an interview might have an 
influence on their answers. The conclusion that can be drawn from the 
analysis is that the bias of anchoring heuristics on the households’ saving 
patterns is very significant. The primary structure of the question order has a 
considerable effect on further decisions.  The analysed case shows that 
behavioural economics can contribute a lot to understanding customer 
behaviour and could indeed drive more accurate measurement. 
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Introduction 
 A major part of our knowledge on consumers is derived from 
marketing research where respondents declare their specific behaviours. 
Researchers are aware that drawing conclusions on the basis of the results of 
declarative studies is encumbered with error. When a study is properly 
conducted one can assume that declarations are congruent with what a 
respondent really thinks, but does such a statement actually end the 
discussion related to the interpretation of results?121 The results of empirical 
studies conducted by Fishbein and Ajzen regarding the conformity of 
declarations and behaviours demonstrate that between the measurement of 
                                                          
121 The results of empirical studies conducted by Fishbein and Ajzen indicate that between 
the measurement of behaviour intention and actual behaviour one may obtain correlations of 
approximately 0.8 – 0.9. A detailed discussion may be found in: FISHBEIN, M. Predicting 
and changing behavior : the reasoned action approach, New York :, Psychology Press. 
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behaviour intention and actual behaviour high correlations may be obtained, 
these will never be functional dependencies though. [Fishbein i Ajzen 2010] 
 Bringing together psychological knowledge and economics, results in 
a new focus on many issues which are vital from the point of view of 
economics, this also concerns market and social research. Researchers are 
currently aware that even if the textbook situation of perfect co-operation 
with a respondent is assumed, one more factor needs to be taken into 
consideration. A consumer unable to go through the whole decision-making 
process for each decision, relies on certain simplifications (heuristics), which 
may lead to erroneous decisions. In the case of conducting  research, 
significant concern is that a respondent might pursue decision path declaring 
future behaviour while displaying a different one in reality. This might result 
from the structure of the research tool, even though a questionnaire had been 
constructed in accordance with the appropriate principles. 
  
Algorithms and heuristics in the decision-making process 
 It is worth bringing two views on decision making closer. The first 
approach, which assumes the rationality of a consumer’s decision is closer to 
the assumptions of the applied standard decision algorithms. An algorithm is 
a certain repeatable procedure which guarantees the obtaining of a correct, 
unambiguous solution provided such a solution exists. The repeatability of a 
procedure guarantees an identical result using identical input variables. 
[Piech 2003] On such assumptions and with specified input conditions a 
consumer’s decisions are predictable. 
 The other approach takes into account the achievements of economic 
psychology, basing on the shortcuts in decisions (mainly rules of 
thumb).[Belsky i Gilovich 1999]  Main of these shortcuts are called 
heuristics and are defined as intuitive, rapid and automatic system reducing 
the complex decisions [Shiloh i in. 2002] or as  disproportionate influence on 
decision makers to make judgments that are biased toward an initially 
presented value.[Kahneman i Tversky 1979] The most important heuristics 
which have an influence on consumer decisions are: availability heuristic – 
causing a change in the judgment of  an events’ probability on the basis of 
similar events in memory; representativeness heuristic – distorting judgment 
on the basis of how easy it is to imagine certain events; anchoring heuristic – 
assuming the influence of previously possessed information on future 
decisions, even though the previous information has no influence on a given 
phenomenon in any way or is untrue.  
 
Anchoring heuristic and the determinants of susceptibility to it 
 As has been mentioned, in case of anchoring heuristic the consumer 
relates the whole decision-making process to any available piece of 
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information on a given topic (where no such pieces of information or 
associations are available, he/she might use an external suggestion) and 
based on that information the consumer creates a representation of the value 
of particular choice variants. [Kahneman i Tversky 1979] From the point of 
view of a researcher, the knowledge of heuristics helps in designing research 
tools in a better way (so that the declarations are as close to actual 
behaviours as possible) and in interpreting the results. Another step in the 
direction of inclusion of knowledge within the scope of economic 
psychology to market research is the knowledge of heterogeneity of 
susceptibility to heuristics and familiarity with determinants of this 
susceptibility. 
  
Previous studies 
 The anchoring heuristic was introduced and popularized in seminal 
work of Kahnemann and Tversky [1974] but it was also mentioned in 
previously by Brown in 1953 [Chapman i Johnson 1994] and by 
Slovic.[1967] As well as the aforementioned pioneering work of Kahneman 
and Tversky anchoring effect has been corroborated in many empirical 
studies. Davis studied married couples asking one person to predict the other 
person’s consumer choices. [Davis et al. 1986]  The fivefold repeated study 
demonstrated strong anchoring of forecasts in preferences of the surveyed 
individuals. Anchoring effect was also confirmed in the studies of decisions 
taken in organisations[Bromiley 1987], and what is interesting, this heuristic 
is also present even in the estimates of real estate experts [Kristensen i 
Gärling 2000] and in the decisions of financial analysts. [Northcraft i Neale 
1987] 
 The anchoring effect has also been translated into business practice. 
On the basis of Wansink’s research results [Wansink i in. 1998] one may 
conclude that information at the point of sale may indeed influence the 
number of purchased goods.  
 Other publications corroborating the effect of the anchoring heuristic 
constitute a ten-year-old cycle of experiments concerning the estimating of 
salaries by R. Kopelman and A. Davis [Kopelman i Davis 2004], bidding 
prices at online auctions [Hao i Gwebu 2007], comparison of the heuristic’s 
impact force on estimating time and money [Monga i Saini 2008] decision 
making by investors [Dagher 2009] or decisions of horse-race bettors. 
[Johnson et al. 2009] 
 It is worth highlighting the studies demonstrating the limits of the 
anchoring heuristic. According to the studies of Chapman and Johnson 
[1994] an effect is reduced and even disappears when an anchor value is 
wildly distant from real values. In the same article, scale consistency is 
indicated as a limit on the effect. According to the authors the anchoring 
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effect is only possible when an anchor and an estimated value are of the 
same dimension. On such an assumption, an anchor expressed as the length 
of a section should not influence  an estimated value expressed as e.g. time. 
Also Brewer and Chapman [2002] indicated that the separation of scale on 
which an anchor occurs and a scale with an estimated value destroys the 
mentioned effect (in this case a number was the anchor – a dimensionless 
quantity). 
 However, several years later it was proven that the anchoring effect 
occurs when dimensions are mixed, although it is relatively weaker.  This 
type of anchoring was named „basic anchoring“. 
 In a study by Oppenheimer [Oppenheimer et al. 2007] the 
participants of an experiment were asked to draw lines and then to estimate 
some quantities. It turned out that the participants which drew relatively 
longer lines were more inclined to make higher numerical estimates. Also 
Critcher and Gilovich [2008] corroborated the existence of  “basic 
anchoring”.  
 In research of anchoring heuristic’s impact force, a relatively long 
impact of the anchor effect was also supported. In studies conducted by 
Mussweiler [2001] it was demonstrated that even a week may elapse 
between anchoring and the consumer’s judgment without any noticeable 
diminishing of the effect. 
 According to the literature review some relations have been proven. 
The higher the ambiguity, the lower the familiarity and personal involvement 
with the problem, the stronger the anchoring effects [Exel et al. 2007]. But 
on the other hand many authors  shows the mitigation of this effect [Galinsky 
i Mussweiler 2001];[LeBoeuf i Shafir 2009]. The abovementioned papers are 
only part of a the discussion about the anchoring heuristic. More detailed 
review of the research about the topic may be found in [Furnham i Boo 
2011]. 
 From the point of view of market research practice, the question as to 
whether the anchoring heuristic may influence study results and whether the 
possible influences on the differences related to the course of thinking 
process and decision making may be determined by social-demographic 
features, seems to be much more interesting. In order to identify this scope a 
study was designed, in which the following hypotheses were tested: 
 H1:  Identical questions about  preferences in the interviewer 
questionnaire may generate various results depending on an established 
“anchor” (preliminary information provided which theoretically does not 
influence subsequent questions) 
 H2:  The social-demographic features of respondents differentiate the 
impact of respondents’ cognitive inclinations related to an anchoring 
heuristic. 
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Study purpose and methodology 
 For the purpose of the study two versions of a questionnaire were 
prepared. They contained the same questions which were presented in a 
different order in one thematic section. These questions related to 
preferences in the allocation of funds.122 The respondents were asked to 
decide how they would allocate three specific sums of money (1000 PLN, 
10,000 PLN and 100,000 PLN). Ways of response were selected by taking 
into account the behavioural life-cycle theory as well as Keynesian saving 
motives where preventative and saving motives were combined.[Lindqvist 
1981]  
 One group (A) was first asked to allocate 1000 PLN, then 10,000 
PLN and finally 100,000 PLN. The second group (B) did the same in reverse 
order. A discussed block of questions was placed in the middle part of the 
questionnaire with the questions asked five minutes after the beginning of 
the interview. The questions were placed in the questionnaire in such a way 
so that a respondent answering the first question was unaware that he/she 
will be asked about his/her preferences twice more (the first question was 
placed at the bottom of the page, the subsequent question was placed on the 
next page). 
 According to an approach differentiating levels of money 
management it is expected that the structure will change as the a sum of 
money grows (the more a given sum can be categorised as a property, the 
smaller the temptation to spend this sum instantly, however, the more a 
given sum can be categorised as ready cash, the greater the temptation to 
spend it instantly). 
 However, assuming that an anchoring heuristic will not influence the 
results, the response structures should be similar in both respondent groups 
irrespective of the order of the questions. On the assumption of the 
correctness of the anchoring heuristic’s influence on the choices, the 
differences between the two groups should be visible. To make it possible to 
verify the second hypothesis, at the end of the questionnaire there was also a 
set of questions characterizing respondents with respect to demographic and 
economic features. For the purpose of identifying statistical significance of 
differences obtained in two groups a test of means was employed. 
 
 
 
                                                          
122 The study was conducted on a representative sample of 400 households in the 
Wielkopolska region, Poland. The technique employed was a face-to-face interview. 
Groups selected for the studies with particular versions of the questionnaire did not vary in 
relation to basic socio-economic features (sex, age, education, income). 
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Results 
 The following analysis regards the two most characteristic variants: 
the allocation of funds to current expenses (treating money as cash) and 
funds‘ allocation to an increase in property.  
 Group A, which started with the question about 1000 PLN would 
allocate the major part of this sum to current expenses (85%).  As the amount 
increased the share of current expenses decreased (29% for the amount of 
10,000 PLN and 11% for the sum of 100,000 PLN).  The option „saving in 
order to increase property” reached 5% for the question about 1000 PLN, for 
the question about 10,000 PLN  - 30%, and for the question about 100,000 
PLN -  44%.  Chart 1 presents the results for the first group. 
Chart 1.  Structure of sums’ allocation for group A 
Source: own research 
 
 In group B, which started with the question about 100,000 PLN the 
share for current expenses was considerably lower (4%).  As the value of the 
sum to be allocated decreased that share increased reaching 12% for 10,000 
PLN and 36% for 1000 PLN. „Saving in order to increase property”, on the 
other hand, initially obtained a relatively large share – 57%. That share 
decreases as the amount decreased, down to 36% at 10,000 PLN and 16% at 
1000 PLN. Results for the second group are shown in chart 2.  
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Chart 2.  Structure of sums’ allocation for group B 
Source: own research 
 
 The anchoring of group A on the sum of 1000 PLN and the first 
allocation resulted in an almost a threefold increase of funds allocated to 
current expenses for the sum of 100,000 PLN (group A – 11%, in group B, 
where it constituted the first allocation with no bias from the previous 
question - 4%). 
 Similarly, group B was anchored on the sum of 100,000 PLN and the 
first allocation exerted some influence on successive decisions which 
resulted in a more than a threefold increase in funds allocated to the 
increase of property for the sum of 1000 PLN (16% in group B, whereas 
only 5% in group A). The originally established structure of allocation had 
a considerable effect on further decisions.  Similar results are likely to be 
obtained in other research areas (not related to saving). 
 The average difference in the structure of the allocation of 1000 PLN 
to current expenses is 491 PLN and it is statistically reliable at a level of 
0.05. The study results allow for the positive verification of the first 
hypothesis and makes it possible to state that the impact of anchoring 
heuristic on households’ saving decisions is very strong. 
 For the analysis of the impact of demographic and economic 
variables, six variables which are very often used in marketing research for 
segmentation, were selected: 
• sex; 
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• age (studies at relative measurement level, for the purposes of the 
analysis re-coded to five age groups: up to 30 years of age, 31-39 years of 
age, 40-49 years of age, 50-59 years of age, over 60 years of age); 
• education – three groups: primary + vocational, secondary general, 
higher; 
• life cycle stage (single person, living with parents, single person, 
living apart, a person living with a partner, without children, a person living 
with a partner and children, the youngest child is less than 7 years old, a 
person living with a partner and children, the youngest child is 7 years old or 
more, (all) children have become independent, (I) we live apart; 
• income (up to 2000 PLN, 2001-3600 PLN, 3601-6000 PLN, over 
6000 PLN); 
• optimism (measurement on the basis of four questions regarding 
present condition and four predictive questions, responses aggregated to a 
continuous scale enabled the distinguishing of three groups: pessimists, 
neutral, optimists). 
 In the left part of table 1, the basic information on the results 
obtained for particular segmentation variables is presented, in the right part 
the most important information relating to means testing is provided. With 
respect to the same scale, the study was conducted using actual values 
expressed in the Polish zloty. The table contains actual values, in order to 
simplify interpretation in the subsequent part,  the text values are converted 
into structures and differences are given in percentage points. 
Table 1. Means test for selected segmentation variables 
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up to 2000 
 
A 57 374.6 53.6 -4.46 .000 -407.6 B 28 782.1 71.7 
2001-3600 
 
A 62 412.9 50.6 -6.50 .000 -431.5 B 63 844.4 43.1 
3601-6000 
 
A 50 349.0 59.0 -5.30 .000 -417.7 B 57 766.7 52.5 
over 6000 
 
A 29 305.2 81.3 -5.26 .000 -509.0 B 43 814.2 57.6 
Se
x 
female 
 
A 101 334.2 40.3 -8.10 .000 -457.1 B 91 791.2 39.2 
male 
 
A 156 377.6 32.8 -9.64 .000 -447.3 B 121 824.9 32.8 
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A
ge
 
up to 30 years of 
age 
 
A 39 344.9 64.0 
-3.74 .000 -396.8 
B 24 741.7 86.2 
31-39 years of age 
 
A 52 405.8 59.4 -4.96 .000 -412.7 B 38 818.4 58.3 
40-49 years of age 
 
A 57 421.1 56.0 -5.64 .000 -399.8 B 67 820.9 43.4 
50-59 years of age 
 
A 78 350.6 45.5 -7.45 .000 -474.1 B 65 824.8 44.5 
over 60 years of 
age 
 
A 31 217.7 62.6 
-5.53 .000 -587.5 
B 19 805.3 89.3 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
primary+vocational 
 
A 52 403.9 58.0 -5.30 .000 -417.8 B 46 821.7 53.5 
secondary general 
 
A 108 376.9 38.4 -8.00 .000 -439.6 B 85 816.5 39.4 
higher 
 
A 96 313.5 41.9 -7.96 .000 -479.0 B 79 792.5 42.6 
O
pt
im
ism
 pessimists  
A 45 404.4 65.2 -3.80 .000 -381.8 B 29 786.2 73.4 
neutral ones 
 
A 47 426.6 59.6 -6.310 .000 -459.4 B 50 886.0 41.9 
optimists 
 
A 164 325.6 30.9 -10.43 .000 -472.2 B 131 797.8 32.7 
Source: own calculations based on the studies conducted 
 
 For particular categories of identified segmentation variables the 
differences studied assume values ranging from 17 to 59 percentage points. 
All analyzed differences are statistically reliable at a level of 0.05 which 
makes it possible to positively verify the hypothesis H2 which was put 
forward earlier. Individuals most susceptible to an anchoring heuristic are as 
follows: individuals from the so called „empty nest II“ – whose children 
have become independent and live apart (the difference amounts to 59 
percentage points), the oldest individuals (also 59 percentage points) and 
individuals with the highest income (51 percentage points). On the other 
hand, the most consistent responses were given by individuals who have 
children up to 7 years old (37 percentage points) and individuals with the 
lowest income (40 percentage points). 
 Among the investigated variables, susceptibility is most varied in 
such variables as: life cycle stage, age, household income. On the other hand, 
susceptibility is least diversified within the scope of sex and (contrary to 
expectations) optimism. 
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Conclusion 
 As the study results indicate when designing a questionnaire, 
heuristics’ impact must be borne in mind. The results cited also reveal that 
when interpreting results, heuristics should also be taken into account.  
Knowledge of their impact’s force and diversity within the scope of 
respondents’ features studied, as standard, may help in the interpretation of 
some issues. It relates to the studies in which we pose questions about 
declarations, especially within the scope of a the financial market (decisions 
regarding insurance, saving, taking out loans). 
 It is worth noticing that the use of heuristics, even though they 
sometimes lead to erroneous judgments and decisions, is not, from the point 
of view of the efficiency of a consumer’s action, a worse solution than the 
use of algorithms. Heuristics may obviously be unreliable and more risky. 
They also do not guarantee that a task will be solved. The subsequent use of 
a heuristic in similar input conditions may lead to a completely different 
result, and sometimes may even turn out to be completely ineffective. 
However, heuristics have an edge in the cases of problems that cannot be 
unambiguously and comprehensively defined, or are too complex for the use 
of an algorithm. From the point of view of efficiency, labour input where 
thinking could be done by means of an algorithm, could consume inefficent 
amounts of time. In such cases the application of simple decision-making 
heuristics leading to an acceptable result is much faster. The advantages 
resulting from their use i.e. time and cognitive effort saving are in general 
greater than the costs related to the risk of a potentially erroneous decision. 
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